Active findings
2Built-in scenario
aws/sample_aws_cross_account_trust_unconstrained_plan.jsonCross-Account Trust Demo
Analyzed sample_aws_cross_account_trust_unconstrained_plan.json with 2 normalized resources and 2 trust boundaries.
Analysis gaps
0Trust boundaries
2Resources
2Observations
0Analysis coverage
Audit trail for this run
Sensitive resource labels are assumptions based on resource class. tfSTRIDE does not assess stored data contents from the plan.
Resource coverage
- Provider resources considered
- 2
- Normalized resources
- 2
No unsupported AWS resource types were encountered.
Rule coverage
- Registered rules
- 104
- Disabled rules
- 0
- aws-role-trust-expansion1
- aws-role-trust-missing-narrowing1
Analysis gaps
Unassessed operation paths
No operation gaps were reported by the 5 analysis families that ran. This does not establish complete authorization coverage.
Findings
Severity bands
High
0No high findings.
Medium
2Cross-account or broad role trust lacks narrowing conditions
aws-role-trust-missing-narrowingaws_iam_role.deployer trusts arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer without supported narrowing conditions such as `sts:ExternalId`, `aws:SourceArn`, or `aws:SourceAccount`. That leaves the assume-role path dependent on the trusted principal match alone.
- Category
- Elevation of Privilege
- Boundary
- cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer
- Resources
- aws_iam_role.deployer
Evidence
- trust principals: arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer
- trust scope: principal belongs to foreign account 444455556666
- target account resolution: state=resolved; account_id=111122223333; partition=aws; evidence=aws_iam_role.deployer.arn = arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role
- trust narrowing: supported narrowing conditions present: false; supported narrowing condition keys: none
Role trust relationship expands blast radius
aws-role-trust-expansionaws_iam_role.deployer can be assumed by arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer. Broad or foreign-account trust relationships increase the chance that compromise in one identity domain spills into another.
- Category
- Elevation of Privilege
- Boundary
- cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer
- Resources
- aws_iam_role.deployer
Evidence
- trust principals: arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer
- target account resolution: state=resolved; account_id=111122223333; partition=aws; evidence=aws_iam_role.deployer.arn = arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role
- trust path: trust principal belongs to foreign account 444455556666
Low
0No low findings.
Observations
Controls and mitigating signals
No observations were recorded for this plan.
Trust boundaries
Crossings that drive the model
- Source
aws_iam_role.deployer - Relationship
- admin-to-workload-plane
- Destination
aws_lambda_function.deployer
Rationale: The workload inherits permissions from the attached identity. This attachment does not establish authority to modify or operate the workload.
- Source
arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer- Relationship
- cross-account-or-role-access
- Destination
aws_iam_role.deployer
Rationale: A foreign AWS account can cross into this role's trust boundary.
Raw outputs
Stable contract and markdown
JSON report
{
"kind": "tfstride-report",
"version": "1.3",
"tool": {
"name": "tfstride",
"version": "0.5.0"
},
"title": "Cross-Account Trust Demo",
"analyzed_file": "sample_aws_cross_account_trust_unconstrained_plan.json",
"analyzed_path": "sample_aws_cross_account_trust_unconstrained_plan.json",
"summary": {
"normalized_resources": 2,
"unsupported_resources": 0,
"trust_boundaries": 2,
"active_findings": 2,
"total_findings": 2,
"suppressed_findings": 0,
"baselined_findings": 0,
"severity_counts": {
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0
}
},
"filtering": {
"total_findings": 2,
"active_findings": 2,
"suppressed_findings": 0,
"baselined_findings": 0,
"suppressions_path": null,
"baseline_path": null
},
"analysis_coverage": {
"resources": {
"total_resources": 2,
"provider_resources": 2,
"normalized_resources": 2,
"unsupported_resources": 0,
"plan_time_unknown_resources": 0,
"unsupported_resource_types": {}
},
"rules": {
"registered_rule_count": 104,
"enabled_rules": [
"aws-public-compute-broad-ingress",
"aws-lambda-public-invocation",
"aws-load-balancer-http-public-listener",
"aws-load-balancer-listener-tls-certificate-missing",
"aws-load-balancer-listener-ssl-policy-weak-or-unknown",
"aws-public-alb-waf-missing",
"aws-cloudfront-viewer-http-allowed",
"aws-cloudfront-viewer-tls-policy-weak-or-unknown",
"aws-cloudfront-access-logging-not-configured",
"aws-public-cloudfront-waf-missing",
"aws-api-gateway-cors-permissive",
"aws-public-api-gateway-waf-missing",
"aws-api-gateway-public-route-authorization-none",
"aws-api-gateway-stage-access-logs-missing",
"aws-cloudtrail-multi-region-disabled",
"aws-cloudtrail-log-file-validation-disabled",
"aws-cloudtrail-management-events-disabled",
"aws-cloudtrail-data-events-not-modeled",
"aws-cloudtrail-insight-selectors-missing",
"aws-guardduty-detector-disabled-or-missing",
"aws-securityhub-account-missing",
"aws-config-recorder-disabled-or-missing",
"aws-config-delivery-channel-missing",
"aws-access-analyzer-not-configured",
"aws-macie-not-enabled-for-sensitive-storage",
"aws-rds-storage-encryption-disabled",
"aws-rds-public-endpoint-enabled",
"aws-rds-backup-retention-insufficient",
"aws-rds-deletion-protection-disabled",
"aws-rds-customer-managed-kms-key-missing",
"aws-rds-multi-az-disabled",
"aws-rds-performance-insights-disabled",
"aws-rds-cloudwatch-log-exports-missing",
"aws-rds-iam-auth-disabled",
"aws-dynamodb-customer-managed-kms-key-missing",
"aws-dynamodb-point-in-time-recovery-disabled-or-unknown",
"aws-dynamodb-deletion-protection-disabled-or-unknown",
"aws-s3-public-access",
"aws-s3-customer-managed-encryption-missing",
"aws-s3-versioning-disabled",
"aws-s3-object-lock-retention-missing",
"aws-s3-lifecycle-noncurrent-retention-insufficient",
"aws-ecr-image-tag-mutability-enabled",
"aws-ecr-customer-managed-encryption-missing",
"aws-ecr-repository-scanning-disabled",
"aws-workload-image-not-digest-pinned",
"aws-workload-ecr-mutable-tag",
"aws-workload-can-modify-image-repository",
"aws-ecs-sensitive-environment-value-inline",
"aws-ecs-secret-access-blast-radius",
"aws-public-ecs-secret-access",
"aws-public-ecs-secret-tampering",
"aws-public-ecs-secret-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-cloudtrail-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-s3-mutation-access",
"aws-public-ecs-s3-object-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-s3-bucket-topology-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-mutation-access",
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-item-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-table-topology-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-read-access",
"aws-public-ecs-kms-decrypt-access",
"aws-public-ecs-kms-signing-access",
"aws-public-ecs-kms-key-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-kms-authorization-delegation",
"aws-public-ecs-messaging-mutation-access",
"aws-public-ecs-sqs-message-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-messaging-topology-disruption",
"aws-public-ecs-sqs-receive-access",
"aws-sns-customer-managed-encryption-missing",
"aws-sqs-customer-managed-encryption-missing",
"aws-sqs-message-retention-insufficient",
"aws-sqs-dead-letter-queue-not-configured",
"aws-secretsmanager-customer-managed-kms-key-missing",
"aws-secretsmanager-recovery-window-too-short",
"aws-secretsmanager-rotation-not-configured-or-too-long",
"aws-kms-key-rotation-disabled-or-unknown",
"aws-kms-key-deletion-window-too-short",
"aws-kms-key-policy-lockout-safety-check-bypassed",
"aws-kms-grant-broad-authorization",
"aws-workload-secretsmanager-vpc-endpoint-missing",
"aws-workload-kms-vpc-endpoint-missing",
"aws-workload-s3-vpc-endpoint-missing",
"aws-vpc-endpoint-policy-broad-access",
"aws-vpc-flow-logs-not-configured",
"aws-vpc-flow-log-traffic-type-incomplete",
"aws-vpc-flow-log-destination-missing",
"aws-eks-api-endpoint-public-unrestricted",
"aws-eks-private-endpoint-not-enabled",
"aws-eks-secrets-encryption-not-configured",
"aws-eks-control-plane-logging-incomplete",
"aws-eks-authentication-mode-weak-or-unknown",
"aws-eks-vpc-cni-network-policy-not-enabled",
"aws-database-permissive-ingress",
"aws-missing-tier-segmentation",
"aws-sensitive-resource-policy-external-access",
"aws-service-resource-policy-external-access",
"aws-iam-wildcard-permissions",
"aws-iam-privileged-role-assignment",
"aws-workload-role-sensitive-permissions",
"aws-private-data-transitive-exposure",
"aws-control-plane-sensitive-workload-chain",
"aws-role-trust-expansion",
"aws-role-trust-missing-narrowing"
],
"disabled_rules": [],
"severity_overrides": {},
"finding_counts_by_rule": {
"aws-public-compute-broad-ingress": 0,
"aws-lambda-public-invocation": 0,
"aws-load-balancer-http-public-listener": 0,
"aws-load-balancer-listener-tls-certificate-missing": 0,
"aws-load-balancer-listener-ssl-policy-weak-or-unknown": 0,
"aws-public-alb-waf-missing": 0,
"aws-cloudfront-viewer-http-allowed": 0,
"aws-cloudfront-viewer-tls-policy-weak-or-unknown": 0,
"aws-cloudfront-access-logging-not-configured": 0,
"aws-public-cloudfront-waf-missing": 0,
"aws-api-gateway-cors-permissive": 0,
"aws-public-api-gateway-waf-missing": 0,
"aws-api-gateway-public-route-authorization-none": 0,
"aws-api-gateway-stage-access-logs-missing": 0,
"aws-cloudtrail-multi-region-disabled": 0,
"aws-cloudtrail-log-file-validation-disabled": 0,
"aws-cloudtrail-management-events-disabled": 0,
"aws-cloudtrail-data-events-not-modeled": 0,
"aws-cloudtrail-insight-selectors-missing": 0,
"aws-guardduty-detector-disabled-or-missing": 0,
"aws-securityhub-account-missing": 0,
"aws-config-recorder-disabled-or-missing": 0,
"aws-config-delivery-channel-missing": 0,
"aws-access-analyzer-not-configured": 0,
"aws-macie-not-enabled-for-sensitive-storage": 0,
"aws-rds-storage-encryption-disabled": 0,
"aws-rds-public-endpoint-enabled": 0,
"aws-rds-backup-retention-insufficient": 0,
"aws-rds-deletion-protection-disabled": 0,
"aws-rds-customer-managed-kms-key-missing": 0,
"aws-rds-multi-az-disabled": 0,
"aws-rds-performance-insights-disabled": 0,
"aws-rds-cloudwatch-log-exports-missing": 0,
"aws-rds-iam-auth-disabled": 0,
"aws-dynamodb-customer-managed-kms-key-missing": 0,
"aws-dynamodb-point-in-time-recovery-disabled-or-unknown": 0,
"aws-dynamodb-deletion-protection-disabled-or-unknown": 0,
"aws-s3-public-access": 0,
"aws-s3-customer-managed-encryption-missing": 0,
"aws-s3-versioning-disabled": 0,
"aws-s3-object-lock-retention-missing": 0,
"aws-s3-lifecycle-noncurrent-retention-insufficient": 0,
"aws-ecr-image-tag-mutability-enabled": 0,
"aws-ecr-customer-managed-encryption-missing": 0,
"aws-ecr-repository-scanning-disabled": 0,
"aws-workload-image-not-digest-pinned": 0,
"aws-workload-ecr-mutable-tag": 0,
"aws-workload-can-modify-image-repository": 0,
"aws-ecs-sensitive-environment-value-inline": 0,
"aws-ecs-secret-access-blast-radius": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-secret-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-secret-tampering": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-secret-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-cloudtrail-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-s3-mutation-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-s3-object-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-s3-bucket-topology-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-mutation-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-item-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-table-topology-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-dynamodb-read-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-kms-decrypt-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-kms-signing-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-kms-key-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-kms-authorization-delegation": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-messaging-mutation-access": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-sqs-message-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-messaging-topology-disruption": 0,
"aws-public-ecs-sqs-receive-access": 0,
"aws-sns-customer-managed-encryption-missing": 0,
"aws-sqs-customer-managed-encryption-missing": 0,
"aws-sqs-message-retention-insufficient": 0,
"aws-sqs-dead-letter-queue-not-configured": 0,
"aws-secretsmanager-customer-managed-kms-key-missing": 0,
"aws-secretsmanager-recovery-window-too-short": 0,
"aws-secretsmanager-rotation-not-configured-or-too-long": 0,
"aws-kms-key-rotation-disabled-or-unknown": 0,
"aws-kms-key-deletion-window-too-short": 0,
"aws-kms-key-policy-lockout-safety-check-bypassed": 0,
"aws-kms-grant-broad-authorization": 0,
"aws-workload-secretsmanager-vpc-endpoint-missing": 0,
"aws-workload-kms-vpc-endpoint-missing": 0,
"aws-workload-s3-vpc-endpoint-missing": 0,
"aws-vpc-endpoint-policy-broad-access": 0,
"aws-vpc-flow-logs-not-configured": 0,
"aws-vpc-flow-log-traffic-type-incomplete": 0,
"aws-vpc-flow-log-destination-missing": 0,
"aws-eks-api-endpoint-public-unrestricted": 0,
"aws-eks-private-endpoint-not-enabled": 0,
"aws-eks-secrets-encryption-not-configured": 0,
"aws-eks-control-plane-logging-incomplete": 0,
"aws-eks-authentication-mode-weak-or-unknown": 0,
"aws-eks-vpc-cni-network-policy-not-enabled": 0,
"aws-database-permissive-ingress": 0,
"aws-missing-tier-segmentation": 0,
"aws-sensitive-resource-policy-external-access": 0,
"aws-service-resource-policy-external-access": 0,
"aws-iam-wildcard-permissions": 0,
"aws-iam-privileged-role-assignment": 0,
"aws-workload-role-sensitive-permissions": 0,
"aws-private-data-transitive-exposure": 0,
"aws-control-plane-sensitive-workload-chain": 0,
"aws-role-trust-expansion": 1,
"aws-role-trust-missing-narrowing": 1
}
},
"references": {
"unresolved_reference_count": 0,
"symbolically_resolved_relationships": 0,
"ambiguous_symbolic_relationships": 0,
"unresolved_symbolic_relationships": 0,
"unsupported_symbolic_relationships": 0,
"unresolved_references": []
}
},
"operation_gaps": {
"reporting_families": [
{
"provider": "aws",
"name": "ecs_s3_access"
},
{
"provider": "aws",
"name": "ecs_s3_bucket_topology"
},
{
"provider": "aws",
"name": "ecs_s3_mutation"
},
{
"provider": "aws",
"name": "ecs_s3_object_deletion"
},
{
"provider": "aws",
"name": "ecs_s3_protected_data"
}
],
"records": []
},
"resource_sensitivity": {
"basis": "resource_class_assumption",
"data_contents_state": "not_assessed",
"explanation": "Sensitive resource labels are assumptions based on resource class. tfSTRIDE does not assess stored data contents from the plan."
},
"inventory": {
"provider": "aws",
"unsupported_resources": [],
"metadata": {
"primary_account_id": "111122223333",
"supported_resource_types": [
"aws_accessanalyzer_analyzer",
"aws_api_gateway_authorizer",
"aws_api_gateway_method",
"aws_api_gateway_rest_api",
"aws_api_gateway_stage",
"aws_apigatewayv2_api",
"aws_apigatewayv2_route",
"aws_apigatewayv2_stage",
"aws_caller_identity",
"aws_cloudfront_distribution",
"aws_cloudtrail",
"aws_config_configuration_recorder",
"aws_config_configuration_recorder_status",
"aws_config_delivery_channel",
"aws_db_instance",
"aws_dynamodb_resource_policy",
"aws_dynamodb_table",
"aws_ecr_registry_scanning_configuration",
"aws_ecr_repository",
"aws_ecs_cluster",
"aws_ecs_service",
"aws_ecs_task_definition",
"aws_eks_addon",
"aws_eks_cluster",
"aws_flow_log",
"aws_guardduty_detector",
"aws_iam_instance_profile",
"aws_iam_openid_connect_provider",
"aws_iam_policy",
"aws_iam_role",
"aws_iam_role_policy",
"aws_iam_role_policy_attachment",
"aws_instance",
"aws_internet_gateway",
"aws_kms_alias",
"aws_kms_grant",
"aws_kms_key",
"aws_kms_key_policy",
"aws_lambda_function",
"aws_lambda_function_url",
"aws_lambda_permission",
"aws_lb",
"aws_lb_listener",
"aws_lb_listener_rule",
"aws_lb_target_group",
"aws_macie2_account",
"aws_nat_gateway",
"aws_route_table",
"aws_route_table_association",
"aws_s3_bucket",
"aws_s3_bucket_lifecycle_configuration",
"aws_s3_bucket_object_lock_configuration",
"aws_s3_bucket_policy",
"aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block",
"aws_s3_bucket_server_side_encryption_configuration",
"aws_s3_bucket_versioning",
"aws_secretsmanager_secret",
"aws_secretsmanager_secret_policy",
"aws_secretsmanager_secret_rotation",
"aws_security_group",
"aws_security_group_rule",
"aws_securityhub_account",
"aws_sns_topic",
"aws_sqs_queue",
"aws_sqs_queue_redrive_policy",
"aws_subnet",
"aws_vpc",
"aws_vpc_endpoint",
"aws_wafv2_web_acl",
"aws_wafv2_web_acl_association"
],
"total_input_resources": 2,
"provider_resource_count": 2,
"normalized_resource_count": 2,
"unsupported_resource_types": {}
},
"resources": [
{
"address": "aws_iam_role.deployer",
"provider": "aws",
"resource_type": "aws_iam_role",
"name": "deployer",
"category": "iam",
"identifier": "release-deployer-role",
"arn": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role",
"vpc_id": null,
"subnet_ids": [],
"security_group_ids": [],
"attached_role_arns": [],
"network_rules": [],
"policy_statements": [],
"public_access_configured": false,
"public_exposure": false,
"data_sensitivity": "standard",
"metadata": {
"assume_role_policy": {
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
"Principal": {
"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"
}
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer"
}
}
]
},
"trust_principals": [
"arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer",
"lambda.amazonaws.com"
],
"trust_statements": [
{
"principals": [
"lambda.amazonaws.com"
],
"principal_entries": [
{
"kind": "Service",
"value": "lambda.amazonaws.com"
}
],
"narrowing_condition_keys": [],
"narrowing_conditions": [],
"has_narrowing_conditions": false
},
{
"principals": [
"arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer"
],
"principal_entries": [
{
"kind": "AWS",
"value": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer"
}
],
"narrowing_condition_keys": [],
"narrowing_conditions": [],
"has_narrowing_conditions": false
}
],
"inline_policy_names": [],
"iam_policy_completeness_state": "complete",
"iam_policy_posture_uncertainties": [],
"iam_permissions_boundary_state": "not_configured",
"iam_permissions_boundary_uncertainties": [],
"account_identity_source_mode": "managed",
"account_identity_arn_inputs": [
{
"field": "arn",
"value": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role",
"state": "known"
}
],
"privileged_access_grants": [],
"public_access_reasons": [],
"public_exposure_reasons": [],
"public_access_configured": false,
"internet_ingress": false,
"internet_ingress_capable": false,
"internet_ingress_reasons": [],
"in_public_subnet": false,
"has_nat_gateway_egress": false,
"direct_internet_reachable": false
}
},
{
"address": "aws_lambda_function.deployer",
"provider": "aws",
"resource_type": "aws_lambda_function",
"name": "deployer",
"category": "compute",
"identifier": "release-deployer",
"arn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:111122223333:function:release-deployer",
"vpc_id": null,
"subnet_ids": [],
"security_group_ids": [],
"attached_role_arns": [
"arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role"
],
"network_rules": [],
"policy_statements": [],
"public_access_configured": false,
"public_exposure": false,
"data_sensitivity": "standard",
"metadata": {
"runtime": "python3.12",
"handler": "handler.main",
"vpc_enabled": false,
"container_image_references": [],
"container_image_posture_uncertainties": [],
"account_identity_source_mode": "managed",
"account_identity_arn_inputs": [
{
"field": "arn",
"value": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:111122223333:function:release-deployer",
"state": "known"
}
],
"ecr_write_paths": [],
"public_access_reasons": [],
"public_exposure_reasons": [],
"public_access_configured": false,
"internet_ingress": false,
"internet_ingress_capable": false,
"internet_ingress_reasons": [],
"in_public_subnet": false,
"has_nat_gateway_egress": false,
"direct_internet_reachable": false
}
}
]
},
"trust_boundaries": [
{
"identifier": "admin-to-workload-plane:aws_iam_role.deployer->aws_lambda_function.deployer",
"boundary_type": "admin-to-workload-plane",
"source": "aws_iam_role.deployer",
"target": "aws_lambda_function.deployer",
"description": "aws_lambda_function.deployer uses aws_iam_role.deployer as its runtime identity.",
"rationale": "The workload inherits permissions from the attached identity. This attachment does not establish authority to modify or operate the workload."
},
{
"identifier": "cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer",
"boundary_type": "cross-account-or-role-access",
"source": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer",
"target": "aws_iam_role.deployer",
"description": "aws_iam_role.deployer trusts arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer.",
"rationale": "A foreign AWS account can cross into this role's trust boundary."
}
],
"findings": [
{
"fingerprint": "sha256:60299a231fe096b74b8babb729e994789afdee7376e066dedeae2ea15198e399",
"title": "Cross-account or broad role trust lacks narrowing conditions",
"rule_id": "aws-role-trust-missing-narrowing",
"category": "Elevation of Privilege",
"severity": "medium",
"affected_resources": [
"aws_iam_role.deployer"
],
"trust_boundary_id": "cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer",
"rationale": "aws_iam_role.deployer trusts arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer without supported narrowing conditions such as `sts:ExternalId`, `aws:SourceArn`, or `aws:SourceAccount`. That leaves the assume-role path dependent on the trusted principal match alone.",
"recommended_mitigation": "Keep the trusted principal as specific as possible and add supported assume-role conditions such as `ExternalId`, `SourceArn`, `SourceAccount`, `SAML:aud`, or provider-specific OIDC `aud` and `sub` checks when crossing accounts or trusting broad or federated principals.",
"evidence": [
{
"key": "trust_principals",
"values": [
"arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer"
]
},
{
"key": "trust_scope",
"values": [
"principal belongs to foreign account 444455556666"
]
},
{
"key": "target_account_resolution",
"values": [
"state=resolved",
"account_id=111122223333",
"partition=aws",
"evidence=aws_iam_role.deployer.arn = arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role"
]
},
{
"key": "trust_narrowing",
"values": [
"supported narrowing conditions present: false",
"supported narrowing condition keys: none"
]
}
],
"severity_reasoning": {
"internet_exposure": 0,
"privilege_breadth": 1,
"data_sensitivity": 0,
"lateral_movement": 1,
"blast_radius": 2,
"final_score": 4,
"severity": "medium",
"computed_severity": null
}
},
{
"fingerprint": "sha256:3c81458a2802d71611ccf7a1c27a31662a31f0698aa3d7bf1583f1c85d6896fd",
"title": "Role trust relationship expands blast radius",
"rule_id": "aws-role-trust-expansion",
"category": "Elevation of Privilege",
"severity": "medium",
"affected_resources": [
"aws_iam_role.deployer"
],
"trust_boundary_id": "cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer",
"rationale": "aws_iam_role.deployer can be assumed by arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer. Broad or foreign-account trust relationships increase the chance that compromise in one identity domain spills into another.",
"recommended_mitigation": "Limit trust policies to the exact service principals or roles required, prefer role ARNs over account root where possible, and add conditions such as `ExternalId`, source ARN, SAML audience, or OIDC audience and subject checks.",
"evidence": [
{
"key": "trust_principals",
"values": [
"arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer"
]
},
{
"key": "target_account_resolution",
"values": [
"state=resolved",
"account_id=111122223333",
"partition=aws",
"evidence=aws_iam_role.deployer.arn = arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role"
]
},
{
"key": "trust_path",
"values": [
"trust principal belongs to foreign account 444455556666"
]
}
],
"severity_reasoning": {
"internet_exposure": 0,
"privilege_breadth": 1,
"data_sensitivity": 0,
"lateral_movement": 2,
"blast_radius": 2,
"final_score": 5,
"severity": "medium",
"computed_severity": null
}
}
],
"suppressed_findings": [],
"baselined_findings": [],
"observations": [],
"limitations": [
"AWS support is intentionally limited to a curated v1 resource set rather than the full Terraform AWS provider.",
"Subnet public/private classification prefers explicit route table associations and NAT or internet routes when present, but it does not model main-route-table inheritance or every routing edge case.",
"IAM analysis resolves inline role policies, customer-managed role-policy attachments, and EC2 instance profiles present in the plan, but it does not expand AWS-managed policy documents that are not materialized in Terraform state.",
"Resource-policy analysis focuses on explicit policy documents and Lambda permission resources present in the plan; it does not model every service-specific condition key or every downstream runtime authorization path.",
"The engine reasons over Terraform planned values only and does not validate runtime drift, runtime audit evidence, or post-deployment control-plane activity."
]
}
Markdown report
# Cross-Account Trust Demo
- Analyzed file: `sample_aws_cross_account_trust_unconstrained_plan.json`
- Provider: `aws`
- Normalized resources: `2`
- Unsupported resources: `0`
## Summary
This run identified **2 trust boundaries** and **2 findings** across **2 normalized resources**.
- High severity findings: `0`
- Medium severity findings: `2`
- Low severity findings: `0`
## Analysis Coverage
- Terraform resources seen: `2`
- Provider resources considered: `2`
- Normalized resources: `2`
- Unsupported resources: `0`
- Resources with plan-time unknown values: `0`
- Registered provider rules (AWS): `104`
- Enabled provider rules (AWS): `104`
- Disabled rules: `0`
- Severity overrides: `0`
- Configuration-reference resolution: `0 symbolic`, `0 ambiguous`, `0 unresolved`, `0 unsupported`
- Recorded unresolved modeled references: `0`
- Findings by rule:
- `aws-role-trust-expansion`: `1`
- `aws-role-trust-missing-narrowing`: `1`
Sensitive resource labels are assumptions based on resource class. tfSTRIDE does not assess stored data contents from the plan.
## Discovered Trust Boundaries
### `admin-to-workload-plane`
- Source: `aws_iam_role.deployer`
- Target: `aws_lambda_function.deployer`
- Description: aws_lambda_function.deployer uses aws_iam_role.deployer as its runtime identity.
- Rationale: The workload inherits permissions from the attached identity. This attachment does not establish authority to modify or operate the workload.
### `cross-account-or-role-access`
- Source: `arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer`
- Target: `aws_iam_role.deployer`
- Description: aws_iam_role.deployer trusts arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer.
- Rationale: A foreign AWS account can cross into this role's trust boundary.
## Findings
### High
No findings in this severity band.
### Medium
#### Cross-account or broad role trust lacks narrowing conditions
- STRIDE category: Elevation of Privilege
- Affected resources: `aws_iam_role.deployer`
- Trust boundary: `cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer`
- Severity reasoning: internet_exposure +0, privilege_breadth +1, data_sensitivity +0, lateral_movement +1, blast_radius +2, final_score 4 => medium
- Rationale: aws_iam_role.deployer trusts arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer without supported narrowing conditions such as `sts:ExternalId`, `aws:SourceArn`, or `aws:SourceAccount`. That leaves the assume-role path dependent on the trusted principal match alone.
- Recommended mitigation: Keep the trusted principal as specific as possible and add supported assume-role conditions such as `ExternalId`, `SourceArn`, `SourceAccount`, `SAML:aud`, or provider-specific OIDC `aud` and `sub` checks when crossing accounts or trusting broad or federated principals.
- Evidence:
- trust principals: arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer
- trust scope: principal belongs to foreign account 444455556666
- target account resolution: state=resolved; account_id=111122223333; partition=aws; evidence=aws_iam_role.deployer.arn = arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role
- trust narrowing: supported narrowing conditions present: false; supported narrowing condition keys: none
#### Role trust relationship expands blast radius
- STRIDE category: Elevation of Privilege
- Affected resources: `aws_iam_role.deployer`
- Trust boundary: `cross-account-or-role-access:arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer->aws_iam_role.deployer`
- Severity reasoning: internet_exposure +0, privilege_breadth +1, data_sensitivity +0, lateral_movement +2, blast_radius +2, final_score 5 => medium
- Rationale: aws_iam_role.deployer can be assumed by arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer. Broad or foreign-account trust relationships increase the chance that compromise in one identity domain spills into another.
- Recommended mitigation: Limit trust policies to the exact service principals or roles required, prefer role ARNs over account root where possible, and add conditions such as `ExternalId`, source ARN, SAML audience, or OIDC audience and subject checks.
- Evidence:
- trust principals: arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/github-actions-deployer
- target account resolution: state=resolved; account_id=111122223333; partition=aws; evidence=aws_iam_role.deployer.arn = arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/release-deployer-role
- trust path: trust principal belongs to foreign account 444455556666
### Low
No findings in this severity band.
## Limitations / Unsupported Resources
- AWS support is intentionally limited to a curated v1 resource set rather than the full Terraform AWS provider.
- Subnet public/private classification prefers explicit route table associations and NAT or internet routes when present, but it does not model main-route-table inheritance or every routing edge case.
- IAM analysis resolves inline role policies, customer-managed role-policy attachments, and EC2 instance profiles present in the plan, but it does not expand AWS-managed policy documents that are not materialized in Terraform state.
- Resource-policy analysis focuses on explicit policy documents and Lambda permission resources present in the plan; it does not model every service-specific condition key or every downstream runtime authorization path.
- The engine reasons over Terraform planned values only and does not validate runtime drift, runtime audit evidence, or post-deployment control-plane activity.
Limits
Unsupported or intentionally scoped areas
- AWS support is intentionally limited to a curated v1 resource set rather than the full Terraform AWS provider.
- Subnet public/private classification prefers explicit route table associations and NAT or internet routes when present, but it does not model main-route-table inheritance or every routing edge case.
- IAM analysis resolves inline role policies, customer-managed role-policy attachments, and EC2 instance profiles present in the plan, but it does not expand AWS-managed policy documents that are not materialized in Terraform state.
- Resource-policy analysis focuses on explicit policy documents and Lambda permission resources present in the plan; it does not model every service-specific condition key or every downstream runtime authorization path.
- The engine reasons over Terraform planned values only and does not validate runtime drift, runtime audit evidence, or post-deployment control-plane activity.